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Abstract
In this paper we describe the first dataset for the Polish language containing annotations of
harmful and toxic language. The dataset was created to study harmful Internet phenomena
such as cyberbullying and hate speech, which recently dramatically gain on numbers in Polish
Internet as well as worldwide. The dataset was automatically collected from Polish Twitter
accounts and annotated by both layperson volunteers under the supervision of a cyberbullying
and hate-speech expert. Together with the dataset we propose the first open shared task
for Polish to utilize the dataset in classification of such harmful phenomena. In particular,
we propose two subtasks: 1) binary classification of harmful and non-harmful tweets, and
2) multiclass classification between two types of harmful information (cyberbullying and
hate-speech), and other. The first installment of the shared task became a success by reaching
fourteen overall submissions, hence proving a high demand for research applying such data.
Keywords
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1. Introduction
Although the problem of humiliating and slandering people with the use of Internet commu-
nication measures has existed almost as long as the communication via the Internet between
people itself, the appearance of new handheld mobile devices, such as smartphones and
tablet computers, which allow using the Internet not only at home, work or school but also
in commute, has further intensified the problem. Especially recent decade, during which
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Social Networking Services (SNS) such as Facebook and Twitter, rapidly grew in popularity,
has brought to light the problem of unethical behaviors in Internet environments, which has
been greatly impairing public mental health in adults and, for the most, in younger users and
children. It is the problem of cyberbullying (CB), defined as exploitation of open online means
of communication, such as Internet forum boards, or SNS to convey harmful and disturbing
information about private individuals, often children and students.
To deal with the problem, researchers around the world have begun to study the problem
with a goal of automatic detection of Internet entries containing harmful information and
reporting them to SNS service providers for further analysis and deletion. After ten years of
research (Ptaszynski et al. 2010b,a, Nitta et al. 2013a,b, Hatakeyama et al. 2015, Ptaszynski
et al. 2015, Lempa et al. 2015, Hatakeyama et al. 2016a, Ptaszynski et al. 2016a, Hatakeyama
et al. 2016b, Ptaszynski et al. 2016b, 2017, 2018, Ptaszynski and Masui 2018, Ptaszynski et
al. 2019), a sufficient knowledge base on this problem has been collected for languages of
well-developed countries, such as the US, or Japan. Unfortunately, still close to nothing in
this matter has been done for the Polish language. With the presented here dataset and the
initial experiments performed with the dataset, we aim at filling this gap.
The dataset, as well as open shared task supplementing the dataset, allows the users to try
their classification methods to determine whether an Internet entry is classifiable as part of
cyberbullying narration or not. The entries contain tweets collected from openly available
Twitter discussions. Since much of the problem of automatic cyberbullying detection often
relies on feature selection and feature engineering (Ptaszynski et al. 2017, 2019), the tweets
are be provided as such, with minimal preprocessing. The preprocessing, if used, is applied
mostly for cases when information about a private person is revealed to the public.
The goal of the main task is to classify the tweets into cyberbullying/harmful and non-
cyberbullying/non-harmful with the highest possible Precision, Recall, balanced F-score and
Accuracy. In an additional subtask, the goal is to differentiate between various types of harmful
information, in particular cyberbullying and hate-speech, and non-harmful1.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 we describe how the data
for the dataset was collected. In Section 3 we explain the whole annotation process, including
our working definition of cyberbullying and guidelines for annotation used in training the
annotators. In Section 4 we perform an in-depth analysis of the created dataset, which
includes both general statistical analysis as well as deeper example-based specific analysis.
In Section 5 we describe the task we propose together with the dataset, in particular two
subtasks for classification of 1) harmful information in general and 2) two specific types of
harmful information. We also propose the default means for evaluation and introduce the
participants that took part in the first installment of the shared task. In Section 4 we present
the results of the participants in comparison to a number of baselines. Finally, in Sections 7
and 8 we conclude the paper and set up plans and directions for the near future.
1The dataset, together with the two subtasks proposed for it, is available under the following URL: https:
//github.com/ptaszynski/cyberbullying-Polish
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2. Data Collection and Preprocessing
2.1. Collection
In order to collect the data, we used Standard Twitter API2. It has a number of limitations,
which we had to work around. For example, the number of requests per 15-minute window
and the number of tweets that could be downloaded in one request is limited by Twitter API.
We respected those limits, and after exhausting the limit of requests the download script simply
waited for another download window. Twitter API was used via the python-twitter library
(https://github.com/bear/python-twitter/). Another obstacle was the time limit for
searching tweets. In Standard (non-paid) Twitter API the user is allowed to search for tweets
from past 7 days. That is why we were not able to collect all answers to tweets made from
our initial starting accounts. Our script saved data received from Twitter in MongoDB using
the pymongo library (https://github.com/mongodb/mongo-python-driver). Twitter
provides tweet data in JSON format, so the use of a document database was convenient for
further handling of data.
The script, written in Python, has been used to download tweets from nineteen official Polish
Twitter accounts. Those accounts were chosen as the most popular Polish Twitter accounts in
the year 20173. By popular we understand those with the largest number of observers, those
with a rapidly growing number of observers, those who collected the most user activity, those
most often mentioned and those who themselves tweeted most often. In particular, we initially
looked at the following accounts: @tvn24, @MTVPolska, @lewy_official, @sikorskiradek,
@Pontifex_pl, @donaldtusk, @BoniekZibi, @NewsweekPolska, @PR24_pl, @tvp_info,
@rzeczpospolita, @AndrzejDuda, @lis_tomasz, @K_Stanowski, @R_A_Ziemkiewicz,
@pisorgpl, @Platforma_org, @RadioMaryja, @RyszardPetru.
In addition to tweets from those accounts, we have collected answers to any tweets from
the accounts mentioned above (from the past 7 days). In total, we have received over 101
thousand tweets from 22,687 accounts (as identified by screen_name property in the Twitter
API). Using bash random functions ten accounts were randomly selected to become the
starting point for further work.
Next, using the same script as before, we downloaded tweets from these 10 accounts and all
answers to their tweets that we were able to find using the Twitter Search API (again, limited
to the past 7 days). Using this procedure we have selected 23,223 tweets from Polish accounts
for further analysis. Data downloading was finished on 20.11.2018. (Last downloaded tweet
was created at 18:12:32). These 23,223 tweets became the base for the dataset presented in
this paper.
2https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/search/api-reference/get-search-tweets.
html
3According to https://www.sotrender.com/blog/pl/2018/01/twitter-w-polsce-2017-infografika/
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2.2. Preprocessing and Filtering
Since in this initial dataset, we did not follow the conversation threads (as the official Twitter
API does not provide such information), we considered each tweet separately.
At first, we randomized the order of tweets in the dataset to get rid of any consecutive tweets
from the same account. This would help decrease the anchoring bias (Tversky and Kahneman
1974) in annotations since when a human annotator reads tweets from the same account they
could become prone to assigning the same score to many messages.
Next, we got rid of all tweets containing URLs. This was done due to the fact that URLs often
take space and limit the contents of the tweets, which in practice often resulted in tweets
being cut in the middle of the sentence or with a large number of ad hoc abbreviations. Next,
we got rid of all tweets which were exactly the same in contents, which eliminated most of the
duplications. Tweets consisting only of at-marks (@) or hashtags (#) were also removed, as
they do not convey any intrinsic linguistic value as a whole, but rather are used as unrelated
keywords. Finally, we removed tweets with less than five words and those written in languages
other than Polish. This left us with 11,041 tweets. From this group, we randomly extracted
1,000 tweets to be used as test data and the rest (10,041) was used as training data. The
exact step-by-step preprocessing procedure and analysis of how many tweets were discarded
at each time is presented below.
1. Deleted tweets with URLs and retaining only the text of tweets (no meta-data, times-
tamps, etc.) (retained: 15,357/23,223, or 66.13% of all).
2. Deleted exact duplicates (retained:15,255, only 102 deleted, or 0.44% of all).
3. Deleted tweets containing only @atmarks and #hashtags (retained: 15,223, only 32
deleted, or 0.14% of all).
4. Deleted tweets that, except @atmarks or #hashtags consist of only a single or a few
words or emoji, etc.:
(a) Deleted tweets with only one word (retained: 14,492 tweets, 731 deleted, or 3.1%
of all).
(b) Deleted tweets with only two words (retained: 13,238 tweets, 1254 deleted, or
5.4% of all).
(c) Deleted tweets with only three words (retained: 12,226 tweets, 1012 deleted, or
4.4% of all).
(d) Deleted tweets with only four words (retained: 11,135 tweets, 1091 deleted, or
4.7% of all).
After the above operations, we were left with 11,135 tweets containing five or more words,
not counting @atmarks or #hashtags.
The reasoning behind deleting short tweets was the following:
1. For a human annotator a tweet that is too short will contain an insufficient amount of
context, and thus will be difficult to appraise, thus creating many ambiguous annotations.
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2. It is also better for machine learning models to have more contents (features) to train
on, which also suggests longer sentences will help training more accurate machine
learning models. Although one can imagine short tweets also containing aggression,
we can assume that if a system is trained on a larger data it will also be able to cover
shorter tweets.
In the remaining 11,135 tweets we also noticed a few samples written in a language other than
Polish, mostly in English. To solve this problem we used a Text::Guess::Language Perl module4,
which detects the language of a sentence based on top 1000 words from that language. Initial
manual analysis of a small sample of tweets revealed that the module sometimes erroneously
guessed tweets written in Polish as written in Slovak or Hungarian, due to strangely sounding
account names (@atmarks) and #hashtags sometimes used in tweets, but was never wrong
when detecting tweets written in English. Therefore as a rule of thumb, we discarded only all
English tweets, which in practice left us with only tweets written in Polish. After this final
preprocessing operation we were left with 11,041 tweets, from which we used as training
data 10,041 tweets and as 1000 tweets as test data.
Together with the dataset we also released a short Perl script used to discard tweets in English
from Polish data (onlypolish.pl), as well as tweets that contain only @atmarks or #hashtags
(extractnohashatmarks.pl).
3. Annotation Schema
3.1. Cyberbullying – a Working Definition
To develop the annotation schema for annotating the downloaded tweets we firstly prepared
our working definition of cyberbullying. Although there is a number of general definitions of
the problem, most definitions (Ptaszynski and Masui 2018) agree that
cyberbullying happens when modern technology, including hardware, such as desktop
or tablet computers, or, more recently, smartphones, in combination with software,
such as Social Networking Services (later: SNS, e.g., Twitter, Facebook, Instagram,
etc.), is used in a repeated, hostile and, in many times, deliberate attempt to embar-
rass or shame a private person by sending messages, consisting of text or images,
with contents that is malicious and harmful for the victim, such as, shaming the
person’s appearance or body posture, or revealing the person’s private information
(address, phone number, photos, etc.)
Also, social science studies (Dooley et al. 2009) agree that there are both similarities between
cyberbullying and traditional face-to-face bullying, as well as differences, which make cyber-
bullying a problem more difficult to mitigate. Similarities, which make the problem classifiable
as a kind of bullying, include: peer group, such as classmates in face-to-face bullying and
friends from groups on SNS, which in reality also often overlap; repetitiveness of bullying
4https://metacpan.org/pod/Text::Guess::Language
94 Michal Ptaszynski, Agata Pieciukiewicz, Paweł Dybała
acts, which especially on the Internet, could occur more often than in face-to-face bullying;
imbalance of power, where one person or a small group becomes bullied by an overwhelming
number of bullies and their supporters.
It would be ideal to be able to analyze the data in a wider context, such as threads of conversa-
tions on Twitter. Unfortunately, Twitter API does not allow for grouping of conversations, thus
in this dataset, we consider each tweet separately. This approach is also similar to all of the
previous studies, where each Internet entry was considered as a separate example (Ptaszynski
and Masui 2018). In future, however, it is desirable to find a way to automatically group the
tweets into conversations to be able to annotate roles of participants in cyberbullying, such as
a victim, bully, or bystanders (supporters, defenders).
3.2. Annotation Guidelines
To help annotators perform their task efficiently and to limit the subjective bias of each
annotator, we prepared the guidelines for annotations of tweets for harmful information.
The guidelines include the following:
English version Polish version
phishing, disclosure or threat of
disclosure of private information (phone
number, e-mail, address, account name,
school name/number, class at school,
private identification number (PESEL),
credit card number, etc.)
— wyłudzanie, ujawnienie lub groz´ba
ujawnienia prywatnych informacji
(numer tel., e-mail, adres, nazwa konta,
nazwa/numer szkoły, klasy, PESEL,
karta kredytowa, itd.)
personal attack (“Kill yourself, bitch!”,
etc.)
— atak personalny (“Powies´ sie˛, gnoju!”,
etc.)
threats (“I will find you and I will kill
you”, etc.)
— groz´by (“znajde˛ cie˛ i zajebie˛”, etc.)
blackmail (“I will tell everyone where
you live if you do not pay me”, etc.)
— szantaz˙e (“powiem wszystkim gdzie
mieszkasz, jes´li mi nie zapłacisz”, etc.)
mocking/ridiculing (“Look how fat this
guy is”, “you pimple-face”, etc.)
— szyderstwa/wys´miewanie (“Patrzcie na
tego grubasa”, “ty pryszczata mordo”,
etc.)
gossip/insinuations (“Hey, apparently
he’s a zoophiliac!”, etc.)
— plotki/insynuacje (“Ej, podobno to
zoofil!”, etc.)
the accumulation of profanity (single
profane and vulgar words appear in
conversations fairly often, but a longer
“bundle” can be considered as harmful)
— nagromadzenie wulgaryzmów
(pojedyncze wyste˛puja˛ dos´c´ cze˛sto,
ale ich nagromadzenie moz˙e byc´
potraktowane jako niepoz˙a˛dane)
various combinations of all of the above — róz˙ne kombinacje wszystkich
powyz˙szych
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The scope of the collection of tweets
Cyberbullying is usually addressed at private individuals, thus for the dataset, we used
only tweets from private Twitter accounts. We did not include tweets from public accounts
(politicians, celebrities) since these are usually from the definition exposed to criticism and
personal attacks due to their profession, and often provoke themselves such criticism to raise
their popularity. There is no doubt that a public person might also feel privately offended, but
even in such case, public persons have the means to deal with such a problem (e.g., employees
who massively report abuses in the Twitter system, exert pressure in a number of different
ways, even sue an aggressive user).
Harmful, but not cyberbullying
Despite limiting the scope of search to private accounts, there is always a possibility that
a harmful tweet addressed at a public person will appear in such collection, Therefore, we
decided to also annotate all tweets that do not represent cyberbullying, but are harmful
in any other way, e.g., represent hate speech, racism, sexism, but are not addressed at a
private person, or a specific small group (e.g. not “you” or “a few people from the class”), but
rather a public person, or a specific community in general (e.g., “gays and lesbians”, or “Paki”
(Pakistanians)/“ciapaty” in Polish).
3.3. Annotation Process
Annotators were provided with only the contents of the tweets and performed annotation
one tweet at a time. Each tweet was annotated by at least two, at most three layperson
annotators and one expert annotator. Layperson annotators were trained for cyberbullying
and hate-speech detection with the guidelines described in this section. Layperson annotators
were a group of seven people, all female, in their early twenties. The one expert annotator
was a male in his late thirties with a 10-year experience in research on cyberbullying and
cyberbullying detection.
After layperson annotators performed their annotations, the expert annotator looked through
all annotations and either approved or corrected them. The annotations consisted of the
following type of information:
A) harmfulness score:
Score Label type
0 non-harmful
1 cyberbullying
2 hate-speech and other harmful contents
B) specific tag if possible to specify (see next page)
C) specific phrases if possible to specify in the text.
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Abbreviation Full description Explanation
pry prywatne disclosure or threat of disclosure
of private information, phishing
atk atak personal attack
gro groz´ba threat
sza szantaz˙ blackmail
szy szyderstwo mocking/ridiculing
plo plotka gossip/insinuations
wul wulgaryzmy accumulation of profanity and vulgarities
szy, wul, pry (etc.) various combinations of the above
3.4. Examples of Tweets with Annotations
In Table 1 we show a number of examples. Since the dataset contained tweets from various
private sources, the annotators were trained to annotate the tweets regardless of their political
sentiments. Thus one can see tweets with assigned harmfulness score for both anti-alt-right
(Example 2, 4, 6) and anti-left (Example 5), as well as of unknown addressee (Example 1).
Some tweets contained typos (Example 5, “endekdu” instead of “endeku” – from “National
Democracy supporter”; Example 10 “czulem” instead of “czułem”, “głow” instead of “głowa”).
Some tweets, which, although contained vulgar vocabulary, were not considered harmful as
were not directed at a particular person or a group (Example 12, “dupa”/“ass”). On the other
hand, some tweets, although also not being directed at anyone in particular, were encouraging
the use of illegal substances, thus were considered as harmful (Example 3).
4. Dataset Analysis and Discussion
4.1. General Statistical Analysis
The overall number of tweets the final dataset contained was 11,041 with 10,041 included in
the training set and 1000 in the test set. The layperson annotators agreed upon most of the
annotations, with overall 91.38% of agreements, with a very small number of tweets which
either of the annotators was unable to tag (84, or 0.76%). This was is a high percentage
of agreements, however, this high percentage was mostly due to the fact that most of the
annotators agreed upon non-harmful tweets, which comprised most of the dataset (over
89.76%). Among the final number of harmful tweets, the annotators fully agreed on the
cyberbullying class (1) for only 106 (0.96%) and on the hate-speech class (2) for only 73
tweets (0.66%). Moreover, even some of the tweets with full agreement ended up being
corrected by the expert annotator to other class, thus making the agreements even weaker. In
general, it can be said, that layperson annotators can specify with fair amount of confidence
that a tweet is not harmful (even if it contains some vulgar words), and to some extent can
spot when there is something wrong or undesirable with the tweet, but in majority struggle
to specify, what exactly is the reason of a tweet being undesirable. This provides proof that
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for specific problems such as cyberbullying, an expert annotation is required. This has been
highlighted by Ptaszynski and Masui (2018) for their ten years of research, although there
has been a large number of research applying in annotation laypeople, such as undergraduate
students or Mechanical Turk workers (Cano et al. 2013, Dinakar et al. 2012). When it comes
to the comparison between the training and the test set, the latter contained a slightly higher
ratio of harmful tweets (8.48% for training set vs. 13.40% for test set), which could cause
some problems for the participants.
Table 1: Examples of tweets with annotated information
No. Tweet contents Score Tag Phrases
1 @anonymized_account Jebac´, jebac´, nic sie˛ nie bac´. 2 jebac´
2 @anonymized_account @anonymized_account
Ty sie˛ oszus´cie i kłamco od nas odpierdol. My sobie
damy rade˛ bez twoich kłamstw
2 atk,
wul,
atk
oszus´cie,
kłamco,
odpierdol sie˛
3 Picie to przyszłos´c´, pie˛kna i nieznana, szukajcie
zapomnienia, próbujcie róz˙nych trunków, ła˛czcie
s´rodki psychoaktywne, Powodzenia
2
4 @anonymized_account Ale ty jestes´ z˙enuja˛cy.
Dno metr mułu.
2
5 @anonymized_account Jaki hejt. Hejt to jest na
Tuska, Komorowskiego, przeciez˙ to nie Polacy,
s´mierc´ wrogom ojczyzny. Obudz´ sie˛
2 gro s´mierc´
wrogom
ojczyzny
6 @anonymized_account Wio endekdu, s´cierwa,
zdrajcy, szubienica
1 szy s´cierwa,
endek,
szubienica,
zdrajcy
7 @anonymized_account Jeszcze was zjemy
i wysramy
1 atk,
gro
zjemy,
wysramy,
jeszcze
8 @anonymized_account @anonymized_account A ty
wies´ kretynie CONTI jest Acta2 i czego dotyczy?
Najpierw przeczytaj a potem sie˛ wypowiadaj.
1 atk kretynie
9 @anonymized_account @anonymized_account Ty
pajacu, zmien´ sobie herb na pusty łeb.
1 atk pajacu,
pusty łeb
10 jak ja sie˛ z´le czulem jak byłem dzieckiem w kos´ciele
to głow mala, szopka do kwadratu, nie mogłem
tego wytrzymac´
0
11 Kiedy Christina wychodzi za ma˛z˙ 0
12 @anonymized_account kot tez˙ sie˛ załapał na fotke,
a raczej jego dupa :)
0
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Table 2: General statistics of the dataset
# % of all % of set
Overall # of tweets 11041 100.00%
# of tweets annotator 1 was unable to tag 38 0.34%
# of tweets annotator 2 was unable to tag 46 0.42%
# of tweets where annotators agreed 10089 91.38%
# of tweets where annotators agreed for 0 9910 89.76%
# of tweets where annotators agreed for 1 106 0.96%
# of tweets where annotators agreed for 2 73 0.66%
# of tweets where annotators disagreed 952 8.62%
# of retweets (RT) which slipped through 709
# of final 0 10056 91.08%
# of final 1 278 2.52%
# of final 2 707 6.40%
# of all harmful 985 8.92%
Training set 10041 90.94%
# of final 0 9190 83.24% 91.52%
# of final 1 253 2.29% 2.52%
# of final 2 598 5.42% 5.96%
# of all harmful 851 7.71% 8.48%
Test set 1000 9.06%
# of final 0 866 7.84% 86.60%
# of final 1 25 0.23% 2.50%
# of final 2 109 0.99% 10.90%
# of all harmful 134 1.21% 13.40%
Apart from the above statistics, there was also a fairly large number of retweets that slipped
through both the data preparation process as well as a later annotation (709 or 6.42%).
All of those tweets were not official retweets, but tweet quotations starting with a short
comment “RT”. This situation will need to be taken into consideration when creating the
second, improved version of the dataset in the future.
4.2. Discussion on Specific Tweet Examples
The whole annotation process provided a number of valuable insights reported by the annota-
tors. For example, many annotators noticed that the meaning of most tweets depended on
the context, and when the context was unclear, it was difficult to evaluate them in the given
categories (especially for the harmful category). The entire conversation between Twitter
users would facilitate better assessment, and show the context in which the given tweet
was published. This problem could be solved by clustering tweets into conversation threads.
We will propose a method for automatic clustering of tweets into coherent threads. This
could be done by incorporating, a specific meta-information about at which tweet the mes-
sage is addressed at, provided by the API (in_reply_to_status_id), or taking additional
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advantage of user quotations (@user), which appear at the beginning of tweets usually as
responses, together with time between tweets, which could additionally suggest the tweet
being a response with the higher confidence the shorter the time between tweets.
When it comes to the tweets regarding the authorities or public figures, in cases where the
tweet represented only an opinion without insult or defamation, most annotators assigned
them with the non-harmful label. This was due to the general common sense that expressing
an opinion is not punishable in itself. The annotators also highlighted the need for constant
awareness for separating one’s own worldviews from the criticisms about the authorities in
order to preserve the objectivity during the annotation process. Also, although there was
a clear difference between the language of supporters of the right and the left wing (e.g.,
“lemingi”/“lemmings” vs. “pisiory”/“PiS-supporters”), more general patterns appeared on
both sides, also outside of the political topics.
4.3. Examples of Tweets with Additional Explanations of Reasoning
Behind Annotation
Not harmful
1. “500+ bardzo na plus jednak ten rzad wykorzystał dorobek poprzednich rza˛dów do
swojego populizmu chorego”
2. “Mamy do czynienia z najgorszym prezydentem RP w historii. Kropka.”
— Both samples considered a general opinion. Score: 0.
3. “@anonymized_account I kurwa mamy ta wolnos´c´”
— Despite the appearance of a strong vulgar language (“kurwa”), the expression itself
does not indicate any punishable harmful action, thus the tweet was annotated as
non-harmful. Score: 0.
4. “@anonymized_account @anonymized_account @anonymized_account Matka Boska
była półka˛ i Jezus tez˙.”
— Although at a first glance this tweet might look like a blasphemy, the harmful
effect is caused mostly by an error of a spellchecker (“Polka” wrongly corrected to
“półka”). Score: 0.
5. “Biało-Czerwoni brawo, brawo, brawo! Zbigniew Boniek i Adam Nawałka - wyrazy
szacunku. Robert Lewandowski - wielkie podzie˛kowania!”
— Score: 0.
6. “@anonymized_account WISŁA KRAKÓW !! brawo za dzisiejszy mecz :)”
— Score: 0.
Cyberbullying
1. “[tel. no. anonymized] w Bułgarii numer ten uwaz˙any jest za przekle˛ty poniewaz˙
podobno kaz˙dy z jego włas´cicieli umierali po kilku dniach”
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— Considered a type of phishing. By trying to check whether a given telephone
number is actually cursed (and it is fair to assume there will be such people) it
is possible to fall into a trap and risk of being robbed of personal information.
Score: 1.
2. “@anonymized_account Tu stary chuju PZPRowski zajmij sie˛ swoimi komuchami z PiSu.”
— A typical attack with accusations of supporting communism. Despite originally
being a response to a public account, it looks like an attack at a specific person.
Score: 1.
Hate-speech/other harmful
1. “@anonymized_account @anonymized_account @anonymized_account Rozumiem, z˙e
jutro w sejmie powie to pani protestuja˛cym. Załgane pisowskie skurwysyny.”
— Accumulation of profanity. Score: 2.
2. “@anonymized_account @anonymized_account Was, gnidy powinno sie˛ zaorac´ na
metr w gła˛b i grubo posypac´ niegaszonym wapnem. A dla pewnos´ci zbombardowac´
napalmem.”
— A typical case of hate-speech consisting of over exaggerated death threats aimed
at a public person. Score: 2.
3. “KAIN TEZ˙ ZABIŁ BRATA ALE NIE S´WIE˛TOWAŁ TEGO CO MIESIA˛C I NIE STAWIAŁ
POMNIKÓW NA TE˛ OKOLICZNOS´C´.”
— A good example of a context-dependent mocking/ridiculing of a public person.
Although the name of the object of ridicule is not explicitly stated, thus it is difficult
to grasp by a computational method, it is easy to understand by a normal person
following political events in Poland. Score: 2.
4. “@anonymized_account MILIONY POLAKÓW CZEKA NA BADANIA PSYCHIATRYCZNE
LISA PO WPISACH WIDAC´ NIE ZRUWNOWARZENIE PSYCHICZNE I CIA˛GŁA˛ DEPRESJE”
— The tweet, originally directed at a specific public person (a TV announcer), violates
privacy and can be considered a public slander. Moreover, the expression of the
need for a psychiatric checkup and the use of mental illness (depression), which
typically are diagnosed by a psychiatrist, is in the area of a private matter, while in
this case are used as a slur. Score: 2 (slandering of a public person).
5. “@anonymized_account Elo swastyka na ryju kiedy be˛dzie, sorry z˙e cia˛gle pytam?”
— Although the tweet mainly represents a general negative opinion about the UK, it
also focuses on a specific person (originally a right-wing publicist) accusing him
of fascism. Score: 2 (accusing a public person of fascism).
6. “@anonymized_account Lzy ogromne, kiedys´ usuna˛łem cia˛z˙e˛, nie mów nikomu“
— Considered a harmful tweet written with an aim of provocation, signaled by
the phrase “nie mów nikomu”, since the tweet is publicly viewable, in a socially
controversial topic (abortion). Score: 2.
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5. Task Description
In the pilot task designed for the dataset, the participants are to determine whether an Internet
entry is classifiable as harmful (cyberbullying, hate-speech) or not. The particular goal is to
classify the provided tweets into cyberbullying/harmful and non-cyberbullying/non-harmful
with the highest possible Precision, Recall, balanced F-score and Accuracy. There are two
subtasks.
5.1. Description of Subtasks
Subtask 1. Harmful vs non-harmful
In this subtask, the participants are to distinguish between normal/non-harmful tweets
(class: 0) and tweets that contain any kind of harmful information (class: 1). This includes
cyberbullying, hate speech and related phenomena.
Subtask 2. Type of harmfulness
In this subtask, the participants are to distinguish between three classes of tweets: 0 (non-
harmful), 1 (cyberbullying), 2 (hate-speech). There are various definitions of both cyberbully-
ing and hate-speech, some of them even putting those two phenomena in the same group. The
specific conditions on which we based our annotations for both cyberbullying and hate-speech
have been worked out during ten years of research (Ptaszynski and Masui 2018). However,
the main and definitive condition to distinguish the two is whether the harmful action is
addressed towards a private person(s) (cyberbullying), or a public person/entity/larger group
(hate-speech). Other specific definitions and guidelines applied in creation were described in
Section 3.
5.2. Evaluation
The scoring for the first subtask is done based on standard Precision (P), Recall (R), Balanced F-
score (F1) and Accuracy (A), on the basis of the numbers of True Positives (TP), True Negatives
(TN), False Positives (FP), and False Negatives (FN), according to the below equations. The
winning condition would be to have the highest balanced F-score. However, in the case of
F-score equal for two or more participants, the one with higher Accuracy would be considered
as the winner. Furthermore, in case of the same F-score and Accuracy, a priority shall be given
to the results as close as possible to BEP (break-even-point of Precision and Recall).
Precision =
T P
T P + F P
Recall =
T P
T P + FN
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F1 =
2 · P · R
P + R
Accuracy =
T P + T N
T P + F P + T N + FN
The scoring for the second subtask is based on two measures, namely, Micro-Average F-score
(microF) and Macro-Average F-score (macroF). Micro-Average F-score is calculated similarly
as in standard equation for F-score, but on the basis of Micro-Averaged Precision and Recall,
which are calculated according to the below equations. Macro-Average F-score is calculated
on the basis of Macro-Averaged Precision and Recall, which are calculated according to the
following equations. The winning condition would mean at first the highest microF. This
measure treats all instances equally, which is a fair approach since the number of instances is
different for each class. However, in the case of equal results for
5.3. Task Participants
There were fourteen overall submissions to the task sent by nine unique teams. All the
submitting teams attempted to solve the first subtask (6-1), which was a computationally
simpler problem of binary classification of tweets into harmful and non-harmful, while there
were only eight attempts at solving the second subtask (6-2), which was the three-class
classification problem. Below we briefly describe the systems proposed by each team. All
teams and submitted systems were summarized in Tables 4 and 5. Below we present short
descriptions of teams and systems, for which the authors decided to describe their systems in
this volume.
Korzeniowski et al. (2019) from Sigmoidal team presented three approaches, namely, fine-
tuning of a pre-trained ULMFiT, fine-tuning a pre-trained BERT model, and using the TPOT
library to find the optimal pipeline. The last of the proposed approaches, namely, TPOT with
a logistic regression classifier with non-trivial feature engineering, scored as second in the
Subtask 6-2 (detection of different types of harmful information).
Wróbel (2019) after, firstly preprocessing the data, tested two classifiers, namely, Flair trained
on character-based language model and FastText.
Pron´ko (2019) compared some of the popular text classification models, such as Ngrams and
MLP, word embedding and sepCNN, and Flair with different embeddings, in combination with
LSTM and GRU with word embeddings trained from scratch.
Ciura (2019) applied Przetak, a tool wich identifies abusive and vulgar speech in Polish,
to detect cyberbullying. Przetak is a dynamically-linked library written in Go, which uses
logistic regression over character 5-grams of words. This approach scored as second in the
first subtask (6-1) on detection of any type of harmful information.
Biesek (2019) presented three approaches with different architectures and level of complexity,
namely, a standard machine learning SVM classifier with TF-IDF, a bidirectional GRU network,
and a deep Flair framework model with Contextual String Embeddings. The model applying
SVM outperformed all other submissions for Subtask 6-2.
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Krasnowska-Kieras´ and Wróblewska (2019) proposed a simple neural network setup with
various feature sets, including LASER embeddings, stylistic qualifiers signalling various infor-
mal modifications (e.g., vulgar, colloquial, depreciating, etc.), a list of offensive words, and
character n-grams. To supplement for the imbalanced data samples they also divided separate
tweets into separate sentences with full stop, and added artificially created back-translations
(Polish-Russian-Polish, etc.) of tweets containing insufficient number of classes.
Czapla et al. (2019) from n-waves team based their approach on transfer learning, which uses
large amounts of unlabelled text to reduce data necessary for a target task. They also showed
that initial weights of language model play an important role in model performance on the
target task, and proposed a mechanism to test if the sampled initial weights are suitable for
the target task. Their solution proposed for Subtask 6.1 achieved state-of-the-art performance
and took first place.
6. Results of First Shared Task for Automatic Cyberbullying
Detection in Polish Twitter
6.1. Baselines
The dataset was not balanced, namely, the ratio of each class was different (see Table 1).
Therefore to get a more objective view on how participants of the task managed to classify
the data, we first prepared a number of simple baselines.
The first set of baselines consisted of simple classifiers assigning scores without any insight
into data:
A. classifier always assigning score 0
B. classifier always assigning score 1
C. classifier always assigning score 2 (only for Subtask 2)
D. classifier assigning random score: 0/1 (for Subtask 1)
E. classifier assigning random score: 0/1/2 (for Subtask 2).
As a result, all simple baselines scored very low. For Subtask 1, baseline A (always 0) scored
F1 = 0, which was predictable and simply means it is not possible to simply disregard the
problem as too easy. Baseline D (random) also scored F1=0, which additionally means that
it is not possible to solve to problem of cyberbullying detection by simply flipping a coin.
Baseline B (always 1), by the definition, was able to catch all harmful samples (Recall =
100%), but such a simplistic assumption results in a very low Precision (13.4%), thus causing
the F-score to be also very low (23.63%).
As for the second subtask, for the same reasons as in subtask 1, baselines B (always 1),
C (always 2), and E (random) also achieved very low scores. Baseline A (always 0), achieved
a high microF (86.6%) due to automatically winning for non-harmful cases, which were the
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majority in the dataset. However, macroF provided a sufficient clarification of the score, is in
fact very low (30.94%).
Table 3: Results of simple baselines for Subtask 1
Subtask 1 P R F1 A
Baseline A 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 86.60%
Baseline B 13.40% 100.00% 23.63% 13.40%
Baseline D 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 86.60%
Table 4: Results of simple baselines for Subtask 2
Subtask 2 microF macroF
Baseline A 86.60% 30.94%
Baseline B 2.50% 1.63%
Baseline C 10.90% 6.55%
Baseline E 31.20% 31.16%
6.2. Results of Task Participants
Subtask 6-1
In the first subtask, out of fourteen submissions, there were nine unique teams: n-waves,
Warsaw University of Technology, Sigmoidal, CVTimeline, AGH & UJ, IPI PAN, UWr, and
two independent researchers. Some teams submitted more than one system proposal, in
particular: Sigmoidal (3 submissions), independent (3 by one researcher), CVTimeline (2).
Participants used a number of various techniques, usually widely available open source solu-
tions, trained and modified to match the Polish language and the provided dataset when it was
required. Some of the methods used applied, e.g., fast.ai/ULMFiT (http://nlp.fast.ai/),
SentencePiece (https://github.com/google/sentencepiece), BERT (https://github.
com/google-research/bert), tpot (https://github.com/EpistasisLab/tpot), spaCy
(https://spacy.io/
api/textcategorizer), fasttext (https://fasttext.cc/), Flair (https://github.com/
zalandoresearch/flair), neural networks (in particular with GRU) or more traditional
SVM. There were also original methods, such as Przetak (https://github.com/mciura/
przetak). The most effective approach was based on recently released ULMFiT/fast.ai, ap-
plied for the task by the n-waves team. The originally proposed Przetak was second-best, while
third place achieved a combination of ULMFiT/fast.ai, SentencePiece and BranchingAttention
model. The results for of all teams participating in Subtask 6-1 were represented in Table 5.
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Subtask 6-2
In the second subtask, out of eight submissions, there were five unique submissions. The teams
that submitted more than one proposal were: independent (3 submissions) and Sigmoidal (2).
Methods that were the most successful for the second subtask were based on: svm (winning
method proposed by independent researcher Maciej Biesek), a combination of ensemble of
classifiers from spaCy with tpot and BERT (by Sigmoidal team), and fasttext (by the AGH &
UJ team). The results for of all teams participating in Subtask 6-2 were represented in Table
6. Interestingly, although the participants often applied new techniques, most of them applied
only lexical information represented by words (words, tokens, word embeddings, etc.), while
none of the participants attempted more sophisticated feature engineering and incorporate
other features such as parts-of-speech, named entities, or semantic features.
7. Conclusions
We presented the first dataset in the Polish language, together with an open shared task for
automatic cyberbullying detection, to contribute to solving the recently growing problem of
cyberbullying and hate-speech appearing on the Internet.
The dataset, together with the open shared task supplementing the dataset, allows the users
to try their classification methods to determine whether an Internet entry (e.g., a tweet)
is classifiable as harmful (cyberbullying/hate-speech) or non-harmful. The entries contain
tweets collected from openly available Twitter discussions and were provided as such, with
minimal preprocessing. The only applied preprocessing was for anonymization of mentions
so private persons mentioned in tweets were not revealed to the public.
The goal of the main subtask was to classify the tweets into harmful (cyberbullying or hate-
speech) and non-harmful with the highest possible Precision, Recall, balanced F-score and
Accuracy. In an additional subtask, the goal was to differentiate between various types of
harmful information, in particular cyberbullying and hate-speech, as well as non-harmful.
There were fourteen submissions from nine unique teams. All submissions attempted to
solve the first binary classification subtask, while only eight submissions were for the second
subtask. The participants mostly used widely available solutions for text classification, such
as fast.ai/ULMFiT, SentencePiece, BERT, spaCy, fasttext, or more traditional SVM. Original
methods were in minority, although appeared quite successful. Best methods were based,
either on recently proposed solutions (fast.ai) or original methods (Przetak) for the first
subtask, as well as more traditional machine learning methods (SVM) for the second subtask.
8. Future Work
As this was the first task of this kind for the Polish language, and one of the few first in general,
we acknowledge that there is room for improvement. In particular, we plan on enlarging the
dataset. At this time the dataset contains 11 thousand tweets with only about 9% of harmful
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ones. In the future, we plan to at least double the size to contain at least a comparable number
of harmful tweets, as in research in other languages (Ptaszynski and Masui 2018, Cano et
al. 2013, Dinakar et al. 2012). We also need to improve the procedure for the preprocessing
of the dataset to make sure no noise or redundant information is contained. In particular,
the present dataset contained a number of unofficial retweets (tweets starting with RT). A
thorough analysis also revealed some remaining tweets with unusual URLs, which slipped
through the URL filtering stage.
Moreover, in a future version of the dataset we also plan to annotate on the tweets roles
of participants in cyberbullying, such as: 1) victim, 2) bully and 3) bystanders (3–1 bully-
supporter, and 3–2 victim–defender) to get a wider grasp on the problem of bullying as a
process taking place on the Internet.
Finally, when it comes to the classification methods, although the participants used new widely
available techniques, only lexical information was applied (words, tokens, word embeddings,
etc.). Since it has been shown that a thorough feature engineering is useful in cyberbullying
detection (Ptaszynski et al. 2017), we encourage future participants to incorporate other
features, except words/tokens, e.g., parts-of-speech, named entities, or semantic features.
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